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Abstract
We suggest a model of a multi-agent society of decision makers taking decisions being
based on two criteria, one is the utility of the prospects and the other is the attractiveness
of the considered prospects. The model is the generalization of quantum decision theory,
developed earlier for single decision makers realizing one-step decisions, in two principal
aspects. First, several decision makers are considered simultaneously, who interact with
each other through information exchange. Second, a multistep procedure is treated, when
the agents exchange information many times. Several decision makers exchanging infor-
mation and forming their judgement, using quantum rules, form a kind of a quantum
information network, where collective decisions develop in time as a result of information
exchange. In addition to characterizing collective decisions that arise in human societies,
such networks can describe dynamical processes occurring in artificial quantum intelli-
gence composed of several parts or in a cluster of quantum computers. The practical
usage of the theory is illustrated on the dynamic disjunction effect for which three quan-
titative predictions are made: (i) the probabilistic behavior of decision makers at the
initial stage of the process is described; (ii) the decrease of the difference between the
initial prospect probabilities and the related utility factors is proved; (iii) the existence of
a common consensus after multiple exchange of information is predicted. The predicted
numerical values are in very good agreement with empirical data.
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1 Introduction and Related Literature
Modeling the behavior of multi-agent social systems and social networks has recently attracted
a substantial amount of activities of researchers, as can be inferred from the review articles [1–3]
and numerous original papers, of which we can cite just a few recent [4–8]. High interest to
such a modeling is due to two reasons. First, being able of describing the behavior of societies
is of great importance by itself. Second, modeling the collective interactions of autonomous
multientity systems has already been widely envisioned to be a powerful paradigm for multi-
agent computing.
Nowadays, there exists an extensive literature on decision making in multi-agent systems,
which can be categorized into three main directions: (i) Studies of how the agents, inhabiting
a shared environment, can decide their actions through mutual negotiations. There can be two
types of agents, cooperative and self-interested. Cooperative agents cooperate with each other
to reach a common goal [9]. Self-interested agents try to maximize their own payoff without
concern to the global good, choosing the best negotiation strategy for themselves [10, 11]. (ii)
Studies of how a network of agents with initially different opinions can reach a collective decision
and take action in a distributed manner [12]. (iii) Studies of how the dependence among multi-
agents can lead to emerging social structures, such as groups and agent clusters [13].
The main goal of a decision process in a multi-agent system is to find the optimal policy
that maximizes expected utility or expected reward for either a single agent or for the society
as a whole. Various models of multi-agent systems can be found in the books [14–19].
The maximization of expected utility, expected reward, or other functionals is based on
the assumption that agents are perfectly rational and no restrictions on computational power
and available resources are imposed. However, since Simon [20], it is well known that only
bounded rationality can exist, so that any real decision maker, in addition to having limited
computational power and finite time for deliberations, is subject to such behavioral effects as
irrational emotions, subconscious feelings, and subjective biases [20–23].
The behavioral effects become especially important when decisions are made under un-
certainty. There are two sides of uncertainty that can be caused either by objective lack of
complete knowledge or by subjective preferences and biases. Even when the agents in the
society are assumed to possess complete knowledge, they cannot become absolutely rational
decision makers due to the inherent dual property of human behavior that combines conscious
evaluation of utility with subconscious feelings and emotions [24].
Thus, real decision making is a complex procedure of dual nature, simultaneously inte-
grating the rational, conscious, objective evaluation of utility with behavioral effects, such
as irrational emotions, subconscious feelings, and subjective biases. This feature of realistic
decision making can be called rational-irrational duality, or conscious-subconscious duality, or
objective-subjective duality. Keeping in mind these points, we can call this feature the behavioral
duality of decision making.
As a result of this behavioral duality, a correct description of decision making in a real multi-
agent system has to deal with two sides – maximization of expected reward, and taking account
of behavioral effects [25–27]. To take the latter into account, several modifications of utility
theory have been suggested, such as prospect theory, weighted-utility theory, regret theory,
optimism-pessimism theory, dual-utility theory, ordinal-independence theory, and quadratic-
probability theory, whose description can be found in the review articles [28–31]. However,
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such so-called nonexpected utility models listed in reviews [29–31] have been refuted as being
merely descriptive and having no predictive power [32–36]. A more detailed discussion can be
found in Refs. [37–39].
As has been shown by Safra and Segal [34], none of non-expected utility theories can resolve
all problems and paradoxes typical of decision making of humans. The best that could be
achieved is a kind of fitting for interpreting just one or, in the best case, a few problems, while
the other remained unexplained. In addition, spoiling the structure of expected utility theory
results in the appearance of several complications and inconsistences. As has been concluded in
the detailed analysis of Al-Najjar and Weinstein [35,36], any variation of the classical expected
utility theory “ends up creating more paradoxes and inconsistences than it resolves”.
Stochastic decision theories are usually based on deterministic decision theories comple-
mented by random variables with given distributions [40,41]. Therefore, such stochastic theories
inherit the same problems as deterministic theories embedded into them. Moreover, stochastic
theories are descriptive, containing fitting parameters that need to be defined from empirical
data. In addition, different stochastic specifications of the same deterministic core theory may
generate very different, and sometimes contradictory, conclusions [42].
One more difficulty in modeling decision making of real humans is that they often vary
their decisions, under the same invariant expected utility, after information exchange between
decision makers, as has been observed in many empirical studies [43–50]. This implies that agent
interactions through information exchange can influence decision makers emotions, without
touching their evaluation of utility.
In all previous works, behavioral effects, when being considered, have been treated as sta-
tionary. The principal difference of the present paper from all previous publications is that we
develop a model that takes into account the dual nature of decision making, and allows for the
description of dynamical behavioral effects caused by agent interactions through information
exchange.
2 Main Features of Quantum Approach
To take into account the dual nature of decision making, in the previous papers [37–39], we
have formulated Quantum Decision Theory (QDT) as a mathematical approach for describing
decision making under uncertainty. This approach generalizes classical utility theory [51] to
the cases of decisions under strong uncertainty, when utility theory fails. The necessity of
developing a new approach has been justified by numerous empirical observations proving the
failure of classical utility making in realistic situations.
The mathematical basis of the QDT is the generalization of the von Neumann [52] theory
of quantum measurements to the case of inconclusive quantum measurements [53] involving
composite events with intermediate operationally untestable steps [54,55]. In decision making,
the intermediate inconclusive events characterize subconscious feelings and deliberations of a
decision maker. It is this dual feature of decision making, including conscious logical reasoning
and subconscious intuitive feelings, which explains the successful application of quantum tech-
niques to describing human decision making, without the necessity of assuming any quantum
nature of decision makers. The mathematics of quantum theory turns out to be well suited for
describing the intrinsic conscious-subconscious duality of human cognition [56, 57].
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It is worth mentioning that, after Bohr [58] put forward the idea that the dual nature
of consciousness requires the use of quantum description, a number of attempts have been
made to apply quantum rules to cognition, as can be inferred from the review works [59–66].
The previous attempts, however, were limited by models fitted to particular cases and having
no general mathematical structure valid for arbitrary events. Moreover, as has been recently
shown [67, 68], these models contradict empirical facts.
Contrary to this, our QDT [37–39] is general, being formulated for arbitrary composite
events. Its mathematics is based on the theory of quantum measurements [53–55], which
allows it to be used also for the problem of creating artificial quantum intelligence [39, 69, 70].
As has been recently demonstrated [37–39], QDT is the sole theory that provides the possibility
of making quantitative predictions, without fitting parameters, even in such difficult situations
when classical decision making is not even applicable qualitatively.
In our previous papers [37–39], quantum decision theory has been formulated for the case
of a single decision maker taking a one-step decision. But in a society of decision makers, the
agents exchange information between each other and can make multistep decisions, with their
decisions varying with time due to the information exchange. A simplified situation, when all
decision makers receive the same information from outside, without mutual exchange, has been
considered in [37, 71]. The necessity of developing, in the frame of QDT, a model describing
the multistep decision-making procedure, taking into account mutual exchange of information
between social agents, has been discussed in Ref. [39].
In the present paper, we suggest a principally important extension of QDT allowing for the
description of dynamical collective effects. The main features, distinguishing this paper from
the previous publications, are as follows.
• The considered system is a society of several decision makers, and not just a single decision
maker.
• Each agent of the society is a decision maker transforming the information, received from
other agents, according to quantum decision theory.
• At each decision step, every agent generates an outcome that is a probability distribution
over a given set of prospects.
• Agent interactions are not parameterized by a fixed interaction matrix, but are char-
acterized by an information functional over the probability distribution quantifying the
amount of information gained from other agents.
• The system is not static, but dynamical, the information functional and generated prob-
ability distributions are functions of time.
• To describe a realistic situation, the information exchange is not simultaneous, but de-
layed. This means that, if the agents at time t generate probability distributions {pj(t)},
then the probability distribution that follows, which is caused by the information ex-
change, is generated at a delayed time t+ τ .
• The usage of the theory is illustrated by a concrete example involving the dynamic dis-
junction effect. The predicted numerical results are in very good agreement with empirical
data.
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The proposed system is not a set of simple quantum devices representing players, as those
considered in quantum games [72–76], but rather a collection of complex subjects exchang-
ing information, each representing a quantum intelligence. Therefore the society of decision
makers, acting according to the rules of QDT, is a kind of collective quantum intelligence, or
superintelligence.
Such a collective quantum intelligence can describe any ensemble of agents generating prob-
ability distributions according to the rules of QDT. This can be a human society making
decisions on complex problems under uncertainty. This can also be a set of quantum comput-
ers, or a complex artificial intelligence composed of parts, each of which being itself an artificial
quantum intelligence, that is, a kind of superbrain.
The behavioral model we develop is principally new. The interaction structure of a multi-
agent system, with agents interacting through the exchange of information occurring by quan-
tum rules, has never been considered before to the best of our knowledge.
The organization of this article is as follows. Section 3 explains the basic ideas characterizing
the interaction structure of agents in a multi-agent society, where the interactions are due
to the information exchange. In Sec. 4, we very briefly summarize the main ingredients
determining the probability measure of a single given agent, which is based on quantum decision
theory. Section 5 presents an extension of the theory of quantum decision making to the case
of interacting agents forming a society. In these first sections, we introduce the notations
and definitions that are necessary for the following considerations. Section 6 treats the case
of agents with long-term memory. Section 7 considers the case of agents with reconstructive
memory, while Sec. 8 studies the situation of agents with short-term memory. In Section 9, we
show that the society of decision makers, acting by the rules of QDT, can be interpreted as a
novel type of networks – a quantum information network or quantum intelligence network. To
illustrate the practical usage of the approach, in Sec. 10, we consider a concrete example of
dynamic decision making. We analyze the dynamic disjunction effect, predicting the behavior
of decision makers both, at the initial stage as well as in the long run, when there decisions
converge to a common consensus. Our numerical predictions are in very good agreement with
empirical data. Section 11 concludes.
3 Interaction Structure for Agents Exchanging Informa-
tion
Here we explain the main ideas of how the interaction structure between agents exchanging
information is organized.
Let us consider decision making in a society of N agents choosing between NL prospects
(lotteries) pin, with n = 1, 2, . . . , NL. At time t, a j-th agent generates a probability measure
Pj(t) ≡ {pj(pin, t)} giving the probabilities with which the prospects are to be chosen. As a
result of the human decision making duality, the probability measure consists of two parts, a
rational part quantifying the utility of the considered prospects and forming a classical proba-
bility measure Fj(t) ≡ {fj(pin, t)} and a quantum part Qj(t) ≡ {qj(pin, t) : n = 1, 2, . . . , NL}
characterizing irrational emotions and subconscious feelings, making a prospect subjectively
attractive or not for an agent.
Explicit definitions required for the practical usage will be given in the following sections.
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 
Figure 1: Information exchange between two agents.
 
Figure 2: Simplified scheme of interaction through information exchange between two agents.



Figure 3: Scheme of interaction through information exchange between three agents.
Meanwhile, it is sufficient to remember that the probability measure, Pj(t) generated by each
agent, is the union of Fj(t) and Qj(t).
The exchange of information between the agents implies that each agent receives information
on the probabilities generated by other agents. Thus the information exchange between two
agents is represented by a directed graph in Fig. 1, showing that the first agent receives
information from the second agent, and the latter, from the first one. For simplicity, this
graph can be represented as in Fig. 2. For three agents, their interactions through information
exchange can be shown as in Fig. 3. Similarly, the interaction scheme can be extended to many
agents.
After receiving information from other members of the society, each agent generates the
new probability measure that becomes available to other agents, and so on. Schematically, the
dynamics of decision making with information exchange between two agents is shown in Fig. 4.
The temporal variation of the probability measure Pj(t) includes the evolution of two parts, the
classical probability measure Fj(t), describing the utility or reward, whose dynamics is governed
by the utility maximization, and the dynamics of the quantum part Qj(t) characterizing the
variation of emotions. Generally, the two types of dynamics do not need to be necessarily
connected. Recall that a number of experimental studies [43–50] demonstrated the evolution
of behavioral effects, caused by information exchange, under a fixed utility.
The convergence property of the decision making dynamics depends on the specification
of the agents’ memory. When the process converges, then a j-th decision maker comes to a
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Figure 4: Dynamics of multistep decision making governed by information exchange between
two agents. The last step represents the asymptotic convergence to fixed values of the proba-
bilities that contribute to the stationary values of the probabilities for a specific agent to choose
a given prospect.
stationary probability measure P∗j composed of the set of probabilities p
∗
j (pin), each of which
implies the probability of choosing a prospect pin. Comparing these probabilities defines the
optimal, for the j-th agent, prospect pi∗j for which the probability is maximized: p
∗
j (pi
∗
j ) =
maxn{p
∗
j(pin)}. As will be shown below, for short-term memory, the decision making process
may become not convergent.
4 Probability Measure Generated by a Single Agent
The theory of quantum probability distributions, generated by separate agents, has been de-
veloped in the previous papers [37, 39, 77–81]. The mathematical techniques of the theory are
equally applicable for describing quantum measurements as well as quantum decision mak-
ing [54,55,77]. As far as all mathematical details have been thoroughly exposed in our previous
publications, here we only briefly recall the main points of the theory and introduce notations
that will be necessary for the generalization in the next sections to the case of multi-agent
systems.
The information processing by a single agent proceeds as follows. An agent receives infor-
mation characterized by different types of events An and Bα, labelled by the indices n and α,
and represented by quantum states,
An → |n〉 , Bα → |α〉 (1)
in the corresponding Hilbert spaces
HA = span{|n〉} , HB = span{|α〉} . (2)
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The difference between the events is in their degree of testability. The events An are opera-
tionally testable, allowing for their unambiguous observation or measurement. In contrast, the
events Bα are not operationally testable, being characterized by random amplitudes bα. The
set of the random events B = {Bα} is an inconclusive event [53–55] represented by a state in
the Hilbert space HB,
B = {Bα} → |B〉 =
∑
α
bα|α〉 . (3)
Generally, information is provided through composite events
pin = Am
⊗
B → |pin〉 = |nB〉 (4)
represented by states in the Hilbert space
H = HA
⊗
HB . (5)
These composite events are termed prospects. Note that the states |pin〉 are not necessarily
orthonormalized.
The prospects induce the prospect operators
Pˆ (pin) ≡ |pin〉〈pin| , (6)
which, in general, are not necessarily projectors, because the related prospect states may be
not orthonormalized. The set of prospect operators forms a positive operator-valued measure
[82,83]. The family of all prospect operators is equivalent to the algebra of local observables in
quantum theory.
An agent is associated with a strategic state ρˆ that is non-negative and normalized, such
that Trρˆ = 1, with the trace operation over space (5). The agent generates the prospect
probabilities
p(pin) = Trρˆ Pˆ (pin) (7)
forming a probability measure, so that
∑
n
p(pin) = 1 , 0 ≤ p(pin) ≤ 1 . (8)
A prospect probability consists of two parts,
p(pin) = f(pin) + q(pin) , (9)
where the first term
f(pin) =
∑
α
| bα |
2〈nα| ρˆ |nα〉 (10)
is positive-definite, while the second term
q(pin) =
∑
α6=β
b∗αbβ〈nα| ρˆ |nβ〉 (11)
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is not positive defined. The appearance in the probability of a not positive-defined term is due
to the quantum definition of the probability and the interference of inconclusive events. Such
a quantum term would be absent in classical probability.
Quantum information processing has to include, as a particular case, classical processing.
Therefore the quantum-classical correspondence principle [84] has to be valid. In our case,
this requires that the quantum probability should reduce to the classical probability when the
quantum term tends to zero:
p(pin)→ f(pin) , q(pin)→ 0 . (12)
Thus, the positive-definite terms play the role of classical probabilities, with the standard
properties ∑
n
f(pin) = 1 , 0 ≤ f(pin) ≤ 1 . (13)
Then the quantum terms satisfy the conditions
∑
n
q(pin) = 0 , −1 ≤ q(pin) ≤ 1 . (14)
Keeping in mind conditions (8) and (13), we see that the quantum term can be either negative,
such that
−f(pin) ≤ q(pin) ≤ 0 ,
or positive, when
0 ≤ q(pin) ≤ 1− f(pin) .
In QDT, the term f(pin) describes the utility of the prospect pin, which justifies to call it the
utility factor, while q(pin) characterizes the attractiveness of the prospect and is called the
attraction factor. Two terms, appearing in decision making, reflect the duality of the latter,
including the logical conscious evaluation of the prospect utility and subconscious intuitive
estimation of its attractiveness. The properties of these terms and their practical determination
have been described in detail in the previous papers [37–39].
In this way, the information processing by a single agent consists in generating the proba-
bility measure over the given information characterized by the set of prospects. In the case of
social networks, the classical probability f(pin) can be defined by using a kind of Luce choice
axiom [41,85]. More generally, it can be defined as a minimizer of an information functional or
by conditional entropy maximization [37, 39]. Note that unconditional entropy maximization
may occur to be not sufficient for correctly defining probabilities, in which case one has to
respect additional constraints making the ensemble representative [37, 39, 86].
The quantum term q(pin) depends on the amount of information M received by the agent.
In the absence of information, the initial value q0(pin) can be random, although satisfying
conditions (14). After getting the amount of information M , the quantum term can be written
[37, 71] as
q(pin) = q0(pin) exp(−M) . (15)
In quantum decision theory, the quantum term characterizes the attractiveness of the considered
prospects, and it is thus called the attraction factor.
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Upon the receipt of additional information, the non-utility part of the probability measure
generated by the agent is reduced. In the previous papers [37, 71], we have considered the
simple case where the amount of information M is the same for all agents, being given by an
external source or by a control algorithm. Now we shall study a more realistic situation, when
the agents receive information by exchanging it with other members of the society.
5 Generalization to Multiple Agents Exchanging Infor-
mation
5.1 Arbitrary number of prospects
Let us now generalize the procedure of information processing by a single agent to the case of
many agents forming a society. Let the agents be enumerated by j = 1, 2, . . . , N . At the initial
time, the information is presented through a set of prospects pin enumerated by n = 1, 2, . . . , NL.
The process of getting additional information requires time, so that the probability measure
generated by the j-th agent is a function of time:
pj(pin, t) ≡ pjn(t) . (16)
Respectively, the utility and attraction factors are also functions of time:
fj(pin, t) ≡ fjn(t) , qj(pin, t) ≡ qjn(t) . (17)
There always exist the normalization conditions for the probabilities,
NL∑
n=1
pjn(t) = 1 , 0 ≤ pjn(t) ≤ 1 , (18)
for the utility factors,
NL∑
n=1
fjn(t) = 1 , 0 ≤ fjn(t) ≤ 1 , (19)
and for the attraction factors,
NL∑
n=1
qjn(t) = 0 , −1 ≤ qjn(t) ≤ 1 . (20)
In realistic situations, the probability measure is not immediately generated by the j-th
agent but after a delay time τ . Taking this into account and measuring time in units of τ , we
can write
pjn(t + 1) = fjn(t) + qjn(t) . (21)
The first term is a utility factor, whose value is prescribed by the objective utility of the
problem, hence assumed to be defined by prescribed rules [37–39]. The second term has been
shown [37, 71] to be a function of the information measure Mj(t) quantifying the amount of
information received by the j-th agent until time t,
qjn(t) = qjn(0) exp{−Mj(t)} . (22)
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The initial value qjn(0) is a random quantity satisfying the above normalization conditions.
It is worth stressing the importance of taking into account the delay in receiving the infor-
mation, which makes the consideration realistic, since in real life acquiring information always
requires finite time. On the other side, the occurrence of time delay can essentially change the
dynamics of multi-agent systems.
The total information received by the j-th agent until time t can be represented as a sum
Mj(t) =
t∑
k=1
ϕˆj(t, k)µj(k) , (23)
where µj(k) is the information gained by the j-th agent at the k-th time step and ϕˆj(t, k) is a
memory operator to be specified below, which defines how much of the information at time k
is retained at the later time t > k.
Information measures can be chosen in different ways, for instance as transfer entropy [87–90]
or in the standard form of the Kullback-Leibler relative information [91–93]. We prefer the latter
approach. Then, the information gain for the j-th agent concerning the n-th prospect can be
written as
µj(k) =
NL∑
n=1
pjn(k) ln
pjn(k)
hjn(k)
, (24)
where
hjn(k) =
1
N − 1
∑
i(6=j)
pin(k) (25)
is the average probability for the n-th prospect over all agents of the society, except the j-th
agent.
5.2 Case of two prospects
The problem simplifies when there are only two prospects (NL = 2). This is actually a situation
that is very often met, corresponding to choosing between just two alternatives, when deciding
on “yes” or “no”. Then, keeping in mind the normalization conditions (18) to (20), it is
sufficient to consider only one of the prospects, say pi1, thus simplifying the notation for the
first-prospect probability,
pj(t) ≡ pj1(t) = pj(pi1, t) , (26)
since the second-prospect probability is
pj(pi2, t) ≡ pj2(t) = 1− pj(t) . (27)
Similar simplified notations can be used for the utility factors,
fj(t) ≡ fj1(t) = fj(pi1, t) ,
fj(pi2, t) ≡ fj2(t) = 1− fj(t) , (28)
and the attraction factors,
qj(t) ≡ qj1(t) = qj(pi1, t) ,
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qj(pi2, t) ≡ qj2(t) = −qj(t) , (29)
each associated with the j-th agent.
The utility factors, reflecting the basic utility of prospects, can be treated as time-independent,
which we shall use in what follows:
fj(t) = fj(0) = fj . (30)
To proceed further, we need to specify the memory operator characterizing the type of
memory typical of the considered agents.
5.3 Types of memory
Different types of memory have been classified in psychology and neurobiology [94–96]. For
the purpose of the present consideration, we need to distinguish the types of memory defining
in different ways the temporal behavior of the information measure Mj(t). It is possible to
distinguish three qualitatively different kinds of temporal memory:
(i) Long-term memory, when there is no memory attenuation and all information, gained
in the past, is perfectly retained. This implies that the memory operator is identical to unity,
ϕˆj(t, k) = 1.
(ii) Reconstructive memory, when only the closest events are kept in mind, while all previous
temporal blanks are filled in by reconstructing the past by analogy with the present time [97–99].
This kind of memory can be represented by the action of the memory operator ϕˆj(t, k)µj(k) =
µj(t).
(iii) Short-term memory, when the memory of the past quickly attenuates. In the very short-
term variant, only the memory from the last step is retained, while nothing is remembered from
the previous temporal steps. This assumes the local memory operator ϕˆj(t, k) = δkt, which
defines the Markov-type memory in decision process.
Below, we analyze in turn the behavior of the agents possessing these three principally
different types of memory.
6 Agents with Long-Term Memory
Let us consider the limiting case of long-term memory corresponding to a non-decaying memory
characterized by the memory operator ϕˆj(t, k) = 1. As a consequence, the total accumulated
information (23) is the sum of the information gains at each temporal step,
Mj(t) =
t∑
k=1
µj(k) . (31)
For simplicity, we again consider the case of two prospects (NL = 2). Moreover, we assume
that agents can be divided into two groups, so that all agents within each group have the
same initiation conditions. This amounts to consider a situation with two “group-agents”, or
“superagents” representing two agent groups, exchanging information with each other. We thus
have the equations for the probabilities:
pj(t + 1) = fj + qj(t) , (32)
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with j = 1, 2. The utility factors fj are assumed to be constants characterizing the intrinsic
utility of the prospects for the agents. Generally, the agents of a society are heterogeneous, and
thus the values of fj are different for different agents. The attraction factors vary with time as
qj(t) = qj(0) exp{−Mj(t)} , (33)
where qj(0) are the chosen initial conditions. The temporal variation is influenced by the
accumulated information defined in Eq. (31). The information gain (24) of the j-th agent, at
a k-th step, reads as
µj(k) = pj(k) ln
pj(k)
pi(k)
+ [1− pj(k)] ln
1− pj(k)
1− pi(k)
, (34)
with j 6= i. The initial conditions for the probabilities are
pj(0) = fj + qj(0) . (35)
We also assume that there is no additional information at the beginning, when t = 0, so
that Mj(0) = 0. Time varies in discrete steps as t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Note that, for any k ≥ 0, the
information gains µj(k) defined in (34) are always positive. It follows that the total information
gain Mj(t) > 0 is positive for j = 1, 2 and t ≥ 0.
Analyzing the behavior of the probabilities for varying initial conditions, we find that there
are two qualitatively different types of solutions, depending on whether there exists an initial
conflict between the utility factors and probabilities, or not. The existence or absence of an
initial conflict is understood in the following sense.
(i) There is no initial conflict when either
f1 > f2 , p1(0) > p2(0) (no conflict) , (36)
or
f1 < f2 , p1(0) < p2(0) (no conflict) . (37)
This implies that, at the initial time, the agents already prefer the prospect with a larger utility.
(ii) There exists an initial conflict when either
f1 < f2 , p1(0) > p2(0) (conflict) , (38)
or
f1 > f2 , p1(0) < p2(0) (conflict) . (39)
This occurs when, at the initial time, the agents prefer the less useful prospects. Let us recall
that such a conflicting choice very often occurs in decision making under uncertainty [37–39].
If there is no initial conflict, the probabilities pj(t) tend to the corresponding fj , when
t→∞, as is shown in Fig. 5. But in the presence of an initial conflict, the numerical analysis
of equations (32) to (35) shows that both probabilities tend to the common limit p∗, defined as
p∗ =
f1q2(0)− f2q1(0)
q2(0)− q1(0)
, (40)
within an accuracy of 10−3. This is illustrated in Fig. 6.
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It is worth stressing that the consensual limit (40), under conflicting initial conditions (38)
or (39), satisfies the inequalities
0 < p∗ < 1 ,
which is proved as follows.
Suppose that conditions (38) are valid. Then, using (35), we get
q2(0)− q1(0) < f1 − f2 < 0 .
In the case of conditions (39), we find
0 < f1 − f2 < q2(0)− q1(0) .
In both these cases,
0 <
f1 − f2
q2(0)− q1(0)
< 1 .
Since 0 ≤ pj(0) ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ fj ≤ 1, with −1 ≤ qj(0) ≤ 1, for any C ∈ (0, 1), we have
0 < fj + Cqj(0) < 1 (0 < C < 1) .
Substituting here
C =
f1 − f2
q2(0)− q1(0)
,
we come to the result 0 < p∗ < 1.
7 Agents with Reconstructive Memory
Let us consider the situation corresponding to agents with reconstructive memory, when they
put large weight to the last information gain at time t, and use it to fill up the blanks over all
previous times. This implies the action of the memory operator ϕˆj(t, k)µj(k) = µj(t). Then
the total information received by the j-th agent at time t is
Mj(t) =
t∑
k=1
µj(t) = µj(t) t . (41)
Except for the total information (41), all other formulas are the same as in the previous section.
The analysis shows that, for all initial conditions with different fj and any qj , the probabil-
ities pj(t) tend to their utility factors fj,
lim
t→∞
pj(t) = fj . (42)
However, this tendency can be of three types. If the initial conditions are not conflicting, in the
sense of inequalities (36) or (37), the tendency can be either monotonic, as in Fig. 7 or with
oscillations, as in Figs 8 and 9. But when the initial conditions are conflicting, in the sense of
Eqs. (38) or (39), then there always appear oscillations at intermediate stages, as is shown in
Figs. 10 and 11. In the marginal case, when f1 and f2 coincide, the oscillations last forever,
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Figure 5: Long-term memory under no conflict. Dynamics of the probabilities p1(t) for su-
peragent 1 (solid line) and p2(t) for superagent 2 (dashed line), when there is no initial con-
flict, for two cases of close and rather different initial probabilities: (a) initial conditions are
f1 = 0.8 > f2 = 0.49, with q1(0) = −0.1 and q2(0) = 0.2, so that the initial probabilities
p1(0) = 0.7 > p2(0) = 0.69 are close to each other; (b) initial conditions are f1 = 0.5 > f2 = 0.3,
with q1(0) = 0.4 and q2(0) = −0.2, so that the initial probabilities p1(0) = 0.9 > p2(0) = 0.1
are far from each other. In both cases, there is no conflict and the probabilities pj(t) tend to
their respective limits fj .
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Figure 6: Long-term memory under conflict. Dynamics of the probabilities p1(t) (solid line)
and p2(t) (dashed line) in the presence of an initial conflict: (a) initial conditions are f1 =
0.8 > f2 = 0.7, with q1(0) = −0.1 and q2(0) = 0.2, so that p1(0) = 0.7 < p2(0) = 0.9, the
consensual limit is p∗ = 0.77; (b) initial conditions are f1 = 0.2 < f2 = 0.65, with q1(0) = 0.3
and q2(0) = −0.2, so that p1(0) = 0.5 > p2(0) = 0.45, the consensual limit is p
∗ = 0.47.
as illustrated in Fig. 9. However, this regime is not stable and disappears under any small
difference between the fj ’s, leading to damped oscillations.
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Figure 7: Reconstructive memory under no conflict. Dynamics of the probabilities pj(t) and
local Lyapunov exponents for the initial conditions f1 = 0.8 > f2 = 0.4, with q1(0) = −0.1 and
q2(0) = 0.2, so that p1(0) = 0.7 > p2(0) = 0.6: (a) probabilities; (b) local Lyapunov exponents.
In the case where there is no conflict, the oscillations appear more regular while, in the case
with an initial conflict, they look more chaotic. In order to understand better the oscillation
characteristics, we calculate the local Lyapunov exponents, as is explained in Ref. [100]. For
this purpose, we define the multiplier matrix mˆ(t) ≡ [mij(t)] with the elements
mij(t) =
δpi(t+ 1)
δpj(t)
=
δqi(t)
δpj(t)
, (43)
whose eigenvalues are
e1,2 =
1
2
[
Tr mˆ±
√
(Tr mˆ)2 − 4det mˆ
]
, (44)
where
Tr mˆ ≡ m11 +m22 , det mˆ ≡ m11m22 −m12m21 .
Then for the local Lyapunov exponents we have
λ1,2(t) ≡
1
t
ln |e1,2| . (45)
At the intermediate stage characterized by strong oscillations of the probabilities, at least
one of the local Lyapunov exponents becomes transiently positive, thus, demonstrating local
instability. But in the long run, the dynamics is always stable since, at large t, the Lyapunov
exponents are negative, as is seen from Figs. 7 to 11.
8 Agents with Short-Term Memory
The other limiting case is the society of agents with very short-term memory, remembering only
the information from the last temporal step and keeping no track of any previous information
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Figure 8: Reconstructive memory under no conflict. Weak oscillations of the probabilities (a)
and smooth local Lyapunov exponents (b) for the initial conditions f1 = 0.3 < f2 = 0.4, with
q1(0) = −0.1 and q2(0) = 0.2, so that p1(0) = 0.2 < p2(0) = 0.6.
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Figure 9: Reconstructive memory under no conflict. Strong oscillations of the probabilities (a)
and oscillating local Lyapunov exponents (b) for the initial conditions f1 = 0.6 > f2 = 0.55,
with q1(0) = 0.3 and q2(0) = −0.2, so that p1(0) = 0.9 > p2(0) = 0.35.
gains. This is described by the local memory operator ϕˆj(t, k) = δkt. As a result, the total
information coincides with the information gain from the last step,
Mj(t) = µj(t) . (46)
All other equations are the same as above, with the same initial conditions. In particular, at
the initial time there is no yet any information, as has been assumed above, so that in the
present case we have
Mj(0) = µj(0) = 0 . (47)
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Figure 10: Reconstructive memory under conflict. Dynamics of the probabilities (a) and local
Lyapunov exponents (b) for the initial conditions f1 = 0.2 < f2 = 0.55, with q1(0) = 0.3 and
q2(0) = −0.2, so that p1(0) = 0.5 > p2(0) = 0.35.
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Figure 11: Reconstructive memory under conflict. Dynamics of the probabilities (a) and local
Lyapunov exponents (b) for the initial conditions f1 = 0.8 > f2 = 0.7, with q1(0) = −0.1 and
q2(0) = 0.2, so that p1(0) = 0.7 < p2(0) = 0.9. At the intermediate stage, the probabilities
exhibit chaotic oscillations.
Numerical analysis shows that there exist three types of dynamics. One is a smooth tendency
to limiting states from below or from above, as is illustrated in Fig. 12. The second type is
the tendency to limiting states through several or a number of oscillations, as in Fig. 13.
And the third kind of dynamics is the occurrence of everlasting oscillations, intersecting or
not intersecting with each other, as is shown in Fig. 14. The existence of these three types
of dynamics happens for positive as well as for negative attraction factors. The limits of the
trajectories at infinite time, when they exist, depend on initial conditions and do not equal the
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Figure 12: Short-term memory. Dynamics of the probabilities for the initial conditions: (a)
f1 = 0.99, f2 = 0.1, with q1(0) = −0.4 and q2(0) = 0.2, so that p1(0) = 0.59 > p2(0) = 0.3, and
(b) f1 = 0.2, f2 = 0.6, with q1(0) = −0.15 and q2(0) = −0.4, so that p1(0) = 0.05 < p2(0) = 0.2.
The probabilities exhibit monotonic behavior irrespectively of conflict or no-conflict initial
conditions.
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Figure 13: Short-term memory. Dynamics of the probabilities for the initial conditions (a)
f1 = 0.5, f2 = 0.6, with q1(0) = −0.4 and q2(0) = 0.15, so that p1(0) = 0.1 < p2(0) = 0.75, and
(b) f1 = 0.6, f2 = 0.9, with q1(0) = −0.1 and q2(0) = −0.89, so that p1(0) = 0.5 > p2(0) = 0.01.
The probabilities exhibit decaying oscillations irrespectively of conflict or no-conflict initial
conditions.
related utility factors. Slightly varying the initial conditions leads to small finite changes in the
limiting trajectory values, so that the motion is Lyapunov stable. But it is not asymptotically
stable, contrary to the cases of societies of agents with long-term or reconstructive memories.
The existence of stable everlasting oscillations is also typical only for the agents with short-term
memory, but does not occur for agents with other types of memory.
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Figure 14: Short-term memory. Dynamics of the probabilities for the initial conditions: (a)
f1 = 0.8, f2 = 0.6, with q1(0) = −0.7 and q2(0) = 0.2, and (b) f1 = 0.99, f2 = 0.5, with q1(0) =
−0.8 and q2(0) = 0.4. The probabilities exhibit everlasting oscillations without intersection (a)
or with intersecting probabilities (b). The everlasting oscillations exist irrespectively of conflict
or no-conflict initial conditions.
9 Societies of Decision Makers as Intelligence Networks
A society of agents generating, in the course of decision making, probability distributions over
a given set of prospects, and interacting with each other through information exchange, is
analogous to a network, which can be termed a social information network. Recall that the
mathematics of taking decisions according to the rules of QDT is equivalent to the activity of
an artificial intelligence, since an artificial intelligence, mimicking human cognition, has to take
account of the conscious-subconscious duality typical of human brains [37–39]. And this duality
is well represented by QDT, where the prospect probabilities consist of two terms, utility factor
and attraction factor.
Therefore the society of decision makers, acting in the frame of QDT, is equivalent to a
quantum information network or quantum intelligence network. In other words, such a network
can characterize a composite artificial intelligence, or superintelligence, formed by an assembly
of intelligences. In that sense, it is essentially more complicated than other known networks.
There exists a large variety of networks: internet and web networks, computer networks,
social networks, business networks, radio and television networks, electric networks, phone-call
networks, citation networks, linguistic networks, ecological and biological networks, cellular
networks, protein networks, neural networks, etc. [101–105]. All above mentioned networks are
characterized by classical models. There are also quantum networks that are usually modelled
by quantum spin systems or exciton systems that can be reduced to spin models [106, 107].
In mathematical terms, a network is defined as follows. There is a set A = {aj} of nodes,
or vertices, or agents, enumerated by an index j = 1, 2, . . . , N and a set L = {lij} of edges, or
lines, or links, or arcs, connecting the nodes. The pair {A,L} is called a graph. The graph is
termed ‘directed’ if there is a map m : L −→ R+ ≡ [0,∞). For a directed graph, an edge lij
may be different from lji. A pair of edges lij and lji, connecting two nodes, is called a circuit.
Generally, a network is the triple {A,L, m} representing a directed graph. In standard quantum
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networks, nodes are represented by quantum operators, usually by spin or quasi-spin operators,
and their interactions by parameters of an interaction matrix. Signals are characterized by
wave functions. A node operator transforms a given wave function into another function, thus
realizing a gate [106, 107].
A society of decision makers, or an assembly of artificial intelligences, functioning by the
rules of QDT, can be classified as a network. The set of nodes is represented by decision makers,
whose links are described by the exchanges of information. The corresponding graph is directed,
since the information received by an agent, generally speaking, can differ from that received by
other agents. Keeping in mind that the network dynamics generates probability distributions
varying with time, it is straightforward to interpret this activity as time-dependent decision
making [108]. The delayed information exchange and link directionality reflect the causality of
interactions [109]. The network dynamics describes the information flow [110]. This is why the
intelligence networks can also be termed the information networks.
The principal difference of a quantum intelligence network from the usual quantum networks,
with the nodes given by spins or atoms, is that each agent in an intelligence network makes
decisions, while the standard nodes, like spins, do not do this. The type of intelligence networks
we propose represents networks of agents acting by the quantum rules of QDT, with outcomes
that are not just simple two-bit signals, as yes or no, and which could be modelled by spin
systems with spins up or down. In contrast, in the quantum network proposed here, each
agent generates a quantum probability measure over a given set of prospects. Being based
on common mathematics, the intelligence networks can characterize either an assembly of
interacting human decision makers, or a cluster of several quantum computers, or the activity
of a composite artificial quantum intelligence consisting of several parts, each of which is an
intelligence itself. The network dynamics models the formation of a collective decision as a
collective outcome developing in the process of information exchange.
10 Example of Dynamic Decision Making
10.1 Position of the problem
To illustrate the usage of the theory, we treat below a particular case of dynamic decision
making. There are three main problems in describing such a repeated decision making.
(i) At the beginning, decisions under uncertainty often contradict utility theory, as is dis-
cussed in the Introduction. Decision makers often choose the prospect with smaller utility
factor, in contradiction with the prescription of utility theory. Why this is so and how to
correctly predict the behavioral choice of decision makers at the initial stage?
(ii) There exist numerous empirical works [43–50,111,112] showing that the difference between
the probability of choosing a prospect and the utility factor decrease with time. For a
society of decision makers, we define the experimental probability of a given prospect as
the fraction of agents choosing that prospect. How to prove mathematically that this
difference between the prospect probability and utility factor does diminish with time?
(iii) Empirical works [43–50,111,112] also show that, even if at the initial time the behavioral
probabilities strongly deviate from the prescription of utility theory, in the long run they
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converge to the related utility factors. The convergence of initially dispersed opinions to
a common consensus is the basis of the so-called Delphi method that has been devised in
order to obtain the most reliable opinion consensus of a group of experts by subjecting
them to a series of questionnaires interspersed with discussions providing feedback [113,
114]. The empirical studies raise the following question: How to describe the fact that,
for real decision makers exchanging information, the initially dispersed opinions converge
to a common consensus and, furthermore, the limiting prospect probabilities converge to
an objective utility factor?
We illustrate the above questions by a concrete example involving the dynamic disjunction
effect, and compare our theoretical predictions with empirical data. Since the disjunction effect
is specified as a violation of the sure-thing principle [115], we first briefly recall the meaning
of this principle. Then we give a real-life example of the effect, concentrating on the case of
a composite game studied by Tversky and Shafir [116]. After this, we analyze the disjunction
effect dynamics by using the Tversky and Shafir data to specify the numerical values needed
in the numerical solution of our equations to obtain the limiting values of the corresponding
prospect probabilities.
10.2 Sure-thing principle
Let us consider a two-stage composite prospect. In the first stage, the events B1 and B2 can
occur. One can either know for sure that one of these concrete events has occurred or one can
only be aware that one of them has happened, not knowing which of them actually occurred.
The latter case can be denoted as B = {B1, B2}. At the second stage, either an event A1 or A2
occurs. We are thus confronted with the composite prospects pin = An
⊗
B, with n = 1, 2. The
sure-thing principle [115] states: If the alternative A1 is preferred to the alternative A2, when
an event B1 occurs, and it is also preferred to A2, when an event B2 occurs, then A1 should be
preferred to A2, when it is not known which of the events, either B1 or B2, has occurred.
This principle is easily illustrated in classical probability theory, where the probability of
the prospect pin is
f(pin) = p(AnB1) + p(AnB2) . (48)
Then, if p(A1Bα) > p(A2Bα) for α = 1, 2, it follows that f(pi1) > f(pi2), which explains the
sure-thing principle.
10.3 Disjunction effect
However, empirical studies have discovered numerous violations of the sure-thing principle,
which was called disjunction effect [116–119]. Such violations are typical for two-step composite
games of the following structure. First, a group of agents takes part in a game, where each
agent can either win (event B1) or loose (event B2), with equal probability p(Bα) = 0.5. They
are then invited to participate in a second game, having the right either to accept the second
game (event A1) or to refuse it (event A2). The second stage is realized in different variants:
One can either accept or decline the second game under the condition of knowing the result of
the first game. Or one can either accept or decline the second game without knowing the result
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of the first game. We define the probabilities, as usual, in the frequentist sense as the fractions
of individuals taking the corresponding decision.
In their experimental studies, Tversky and Shafir [116] find that the fraction of people
accepting the second game, under the condition that the first was won, is p(A1|B1) = 0.69 and
the fraction of those accepting the second game, under the condition that the first was lost is
p(A1|B2) = 0.59. From the definition of conditional probabilities, one has the normalization
p(A1|Bα) + p(A2|Bα) = 1 (α = 1, 2) ,
which yields p(A2|B1) = 0.31 and p(A2|B1) = 0.41. Therefore the related joint probabilities
p(AnBα) = p(An|Bα)p(Bα) are
p(A1B1) = 0.345 , p(A1B2) = 0.295 ,
p(A2B1) = 0.155 , p(A2B2) = 0.205 .
According to equation (48), one gets
f(pi1) = 0.64 , f(pi2) = 0.36 .
This implies that, by classical theory, the probability of accepting the second game, not knowing
the results of the first one, is larger than that of refusing the second game, not knowing the
result of the first game.
Surprisingly, in their experiments, Tversky and Shafir [116] observe that human decision
makers behave opposite to the prescription of the sure-thing principle, with the majority refus-
ing the second game, if the result of the first one is not known,
pexp(pi1) = 0.36 , pexp(pi2) = 0.64 .
But in QDT, such a paradox does not appear. Recall that, in QDT, the probability of a
prospect is the sum of f(pin) and q(pin). The sign of the attraction factor is prescribed by the
uncertainty aversion [37–39,59], while its noninformative prior value is found [37–39] to satisfy
the quarter law, with the average absolute value of the attraction factor |q| = 0.25. Thus, in
QDT, we have
p(pi1) = f(pi1)− 0.25 = 0.39 ,
p(pi2) = f(pi2) + 0.25 = 0.61 .
These theoretical results for p(pin) are in very good agreement with the experimental data
pexp(pin) by Tversky and Shafir, actually being indistinguishable within the accuracy of exper-
imental statistics.
Similar results, demonstrating the disjunction effect, have been obtained in a variety of other
empirical studies having the same two-stage games structure [116–119]. All such paradoxes find
a simple explanation in QDT, similarly to the case treated above.
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10.4 Disjunction-effect dynamics
We now take the data from the previous subsection as initial conditions of our dynamical
equations of Sec. 5 and study the time dependence of the decision makers’ opinions.
There are two prospects. One is the prospect pi1 = A1
⊗
B of accepting the second game
not knowing the result of the first game. And the second is the prospect pi2 = A2
⊗
B of
refusing from the second game, when the result of the first game is not known. As is explained
in Sec. 5, using the normalization conditions for the probabilities, it is sufficient to consider
one of the prospects, say pi1.
Taking into account the heterogeneity of agents, we assume that there are two main groups
of agents differing in their initial opinions. The corresponding prospect probabilities are denoted
as pj(t) ≡ pj(pi1, t). Respectively, we use the abbreviated notation for the utility factors fj(t) ≡
fj(pi1, t) and for the attraction factors qj(t) ≡ qj(pi1, t). The utility factor, being an objective
quantity, is assumed to be constant and defined as in the previous subsection: fj(t) = 0.64. As
a result of the inequalities 0 ≤ pj(t) ≤ 1 for the probabilities, the attraction factor can vary in
the range
−fj(t) ≤ qj(t) ≤ 1− fj(t) ,
which in the present case implies that −0.64 < qj(t) < 0.36. The initial values of the attraction
factors must fall within this interval.
We consider the more realistic situation where the decision makers take repeated decisions
and remember their previous choices. We solve the evolution equations of Sec. 5 for this type
of memory, taking as initial conditions for the attraction factors uniformly distributed values
taken in the interval (−0.64, 0.36). The typical obtained behavior of the prospect probabilities
for different initial conditions are shown in Fig. 15.
Two important conclusions follow from the temporal behavior of the solutions. First, for any
initial conditions, the difference between the probabilities pj(t) and the utility factor decreases
with time. Second, all solutions, for arbitrary initial conditions, tend to the same limit 0.64.
This demonstrate that, despite a large variation in the initial opinions, the agents come to a
common consensus by exchanging information in a multi-step procedure.
11 Conclusion
We have suggested a model of a society of decision makers taking their decisions according to
the quantum decision theory. This model generalizes the theory, formulated earlier for one-step
decisions of single decision makers to multistep decision making of interacting agents in a society.
Such a society of decision makers, acting according to the rules of QDT, represents a new kind
of networks whose nodes are the QDT agents, interacting through the exchange of information.
Each agent generates a probability measure over a set of prospects. The generated probabilities
are defined according to quantum rules, which results in their representation as sums of two
terms, positive definite and sign indefinite. The quantum-classical correspondence principle
makes it possible to interpret the positive-definite term as a classical probability or utility
factor. The sign-indefinite term, having purely quantum origin, represents the attractiveness
of the given prospects, and is referred to as the attraction factor. The utility factor can be
considered as given and time-invariant. In contrast, the attraction factor is random at the
initial time and varies with time due to the information exchange between the agents.
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Figure 15: Dynamic disjunction effect. The prospect probabilities p1(t) (solid lines) and
p2(t) (dashed-doted lines) as functions of time t for different initial attraction factors: (1)
q1(0) = −0.35 and q2(0) = 0.05; (2) q1(0) = −0.25 and q2(0) = 0.15; (3) q1(0) = −0.2 and
q2(0) = 0.2. Figures (a) and (b) show the behaviour of the probabilities in the initial and
long-term time intervals t ∈ [0, 12] and t ∈ [500, 10000], respectively. When t → ∞, then
p1(t)→ 0.64 from below, and p2(t)→ 0.64 from above.
It is worth stressing that our approach is principally different form stochastic decision theory.
The variants of such theories are usually based on deterministic decision theories complemented
by random variables with given distributions [40,41]. Therefore such stochastic theories inherit
the same problems as deterministic theories embedded into them. Moreover, stochastic theories
are descriptive, containing fitting parameters that need to be defined from empirical data. In
addition, different stochastic specifications of the same deterministic core theory may generate
very different, and sometimes contradictory, conclusions [42]. In stochastic decision theory,
random terms are usually added to expected utility, while in our case the quantum prospect
probability acquires an additional term, named attraction factor. What is the most important,
our approach is not descriptive and does not contain fitting parameters.
Our model of a society of agents interacting through information exchange is principally
new and has never been considered before to the best of our knowledge. We have suggested
the first model describing the opinion dynamics of real decision makers subject to behavioral
effects.
The probability dynamics depends on the form of the total information accumulated by
each agent. We have analyzed three qualitatively different limiting cases, long-term memory,
reconstructive memory filling the past gaps on the basis of the most recent information gain,
and short-term memory. In the case of long-term memory, the probability dynamics is smooth.
When the initial conditions are not conflicting, the probabilities tend to their related utility
factors (pj → fj). But when the initial conditions are conflicting, the probabilities tend to a
consensual common limit (pj → p
∗). In all the cases, the motion is asymptotically Laypunov
stable.
The probabilities for the agents with reconstructive memory always tend to their related
utility factors (pj → fj), never exhibiting consensus. At intermediate stages of their dynamics,
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the probabilities can experience oscillations, with positive local Lyapunov exponents, which
implies local instability. But in the long run, the dynamics becomes asymptotically Lyapunov
stable.
The society of agents with short-term memory behaves rather differently from the behavior
of the agents in the previous cases. Two types of dynamics can occur. The probability trajec-
tories can tend to fixed points (pj → p
∗
j ) strongly depending on initial conditions, so that the
motion is not asymptotically Lyapunov stable, although Lyapunov stable. These fixed points
are different from the utility factors. The other type of motion is characterized by everlasting
oscillations, which seems to be natural for agents with short-term memory, where there is no
information accumulation, because of which the agents cannot make precise stable decisions.
Also, for such agents, a consensus is impossible.
The dynamics of decisions is due to the time dependence of the attraction factors, since
the utility factors have been taken as invariants representing the objective utility of the related
prospects. The decrease of the attraction factors with time, due to the exchange of information
between decision makers, amounts to a reduction of the inconsistencies with utility theory.
This decay of the deviations from utility theory, caused by the information exchange between
decision makers, has been observed in many empirical studies [43–50, 113, 114].
From another side, as stressed above, a society of decision makers, acting in the frame of
QDT, is equivalent to an intelligence network, where the agents take decisions respecting the
conscious-subconscious duality. Since this duality is typical of human decision makers, the
networks, attempting to mimic the activity of human brains, are to be based on the rules
of QDT. This should be taken into account in creating artificial intelligence and networks of
artificial intelligences.
The usage of the approach is illustrated by a concrete realistic example involving the dy-
namic disjunction effect. Treating this effect in the frame of our theory yields three important
predictions. (i) The initial values of the prospect probabilities are predicted in very good
agreement with empirical data. (ii) The difference between the initial probabilities and the
corresponding utility factors monotonically decrease with time. (iii) In a society of hetero-
geneous agents with long-term memory and randomly chosen initial conditions, all prospect
probabilities tend to a common limit coinciding with the utility factor, thus demonstrating the
existence of a consensus as a result of the repeated information exchange. These predictions
are in agreement with empirical data.
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